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INTHODUC'I'ION 
PLACE AND D1POHTANCE OF THE KODES IN SUA7l.EZIAN l>fli.!.TA?RYSICS 
To any student interested in the modes of Suarez one of the 
first problems that presents itself is, just what is the place 
and importance of the modes in Suarez' I.Ietaphysics? This immed-
iately brings us to disputed ground. On both sides of the ques-
tion we are presented with authorities of great weight. The 
problem itself involves several other disputed questions. 
To evaluate the importance of the modes it would help to 
know whether Suarez had a philosophical system of his own in 
which these modes have their place, or whether his works are 
merely a commentary on St. Thomas. 
Suarez mentions in the Introduction of his Disputationes 
Metaphysicae that he is commenting on Aristotle. He gives an 
index to the twelve books of Aristotle's Metaphysics and the 
places in his work where references are made to Aristotle. 
However, a study of the works of Aristotle, St. Thomas, and 
Suarez will show that Suarez meant to be a co:rrnnenta tor of Aris-
totle in the wide sense. As he himself says, he will use only 
as much of the Metaphysics of Aristotle as will be helpful as 
a groundwork for Theology. This he does. He uses Aristotle as 
a stepping-stone to comraent on the subject of metaphysics. 
However, Aristotle is rr..erely a first stepping-sto:m.e, as it were, 
for he does not strictly follow the order of the Philosopher, 
and also brings in many co1m1entators of Aristotle who have pre-
ceded him. A glance at the Com:nentary of St. Thomas on the 
Metaphysics of Aristotle will show that his work is strictly a 
co1mnentary on that piece of philosophy. He follows closely the 
order of Aristotle, often commenting on him word for word. 
This much must be prefaced to show that al thour:;h Suarez 
mentions in his introduction that he is co~~enting on Aristotle, 
those who say that he is also a co:m.c'llentator of St. 'l'homas, have 
a foundation for their opinion. 
If Suarez 1 work is, then, a co~nnentary on St. Thonas, the 
place of the modes vvill be relatively unimportant, for he will 
be following the system of the Angelic Doctor. If, however, he 
has developed a system of his own, the modes would be independen 
of any other system and their importance greatly increased. 
This then is the disputed question: has Suarez a coinmentary on 
St. Thomas, or has he in his work of conmenting on Aristotle 
developed a system of his own? 
Ueberweg in his Ristory of Philosophy seems inclined to the 
former view when he ranc;es Suarez as a commentator of St. 'rhomas 
Of the later Thomists the most prominent was Francis 
Suarez who died in 1617. 1 
In a footnote, speaking of Scholasticism, Weber in his History 
of Philosophy says: 
The most distinguished among its Post-Henaissance repre-
sentatives is Francis Suarez of Granda a follower of 
St. Thomas. 2 
Glenn, when treating of those who in the 16th century carried on 
the tradition of Scholasticism, draws up a list of those who 
follow Thomism. Under the Jesuits he has listed Suarez.3 
3artmann openly sreaks of Suarez as a corrilT'entator of St. Thomas. 
Nommons dan L'ordre des Jesuites, les commentateurs de 
la Som:me 1'heologique de S. Thomas qui continual t d' etre 
le manuel dans des ecoles: .l:''rancois Suarez. 4 
Pitted against this view we have other outstanding scholars 
taking the opposite opinion. 
'l'his is what De Wulf has to say on the problem: 
Suarez is also the 2~ost eclectic of the Spanish philos-
ophers. Eis philosophy is an ori[inal inte:.·preta tion 
of the scholastic doctrines. In order to constitute it, 
he borrows a great deal of material from Thornism, but 
departs from it in important questions. Accordingly, he 
is not uthe faithful commentator on the An,·elic Doctor" 
which posterity was pleased to call him. 'i'o show this 
it suffices to enumerate s ome of the principal theses 
in his metaphysics and psycholo&,-y. Contrary to St. 
'I'homas, SuareZ' rejects the real distinction betvveen 
essence and existence; ••• In psycholo~J we may confine 
ourselves to pointing out that under the influence of 
Nominalism he allows to the intellect the power of ob-
taininr a direct knowledge of the individual.5 
I'ililler in his History of Philosophy using as his authority 
the learned Ji..ahieu in an article entitled, "L' eclectisme Suarez-
ientr6gives t'l:l.is opinion: 
Suarez is clear and explicit in exposition, and makes 
a careful study of all important authors who have written 
on the question he treats. Some of his theses are a 
return to pre-Thomist philosophy. Suarez not infreq-
uently replaces the metaphysical proofs of St. Thomas 
by others founded on principles of more limited appli-
cation and extension and by arguments drawn from exper-
ience •••• The influence of Suarez was far-reachin.c:, not 
onlv because he abandoned old Aristotelean order of the 
subject matter in favor of that which is now in common 
use, and proposed a form of eclectieism which made a 
wide appeal, but also because of his clear and simple 
exposition of metaphysics.7 
Jaccard in his Fifty Years of New Scholasticism seems to 
intimate that Suarez was more than just a commentator on St. 
Thomas when he asks: 
·~vas he (Thomas) the only Scholastic philosopher to be 
followed? Was it possible to prefer on certain questions 
the teaching of other Scholastics as Bonaventure, Duns 
Scotus or Suarez?8 
With such great names on both sides of this question it is 
hard to make a decision. If we take the position of those who 
say Suarez was ex professo a commentator on St. 'l'homas, we are 
yet presented with the further question: did Suarez in spite of 
hir;lself develop a system of philosophy? Did he by his wide 
diversion from, and disagreement with, St. 'l'ho:r.1as establish a 
system of his own? Here again the authorities disaa:ree. Some 
say, like those quoted above# that although the Doctor Eximius 
disagrees with St. Thomas, he remains a co:rJL"'llentator of his works 
and is wholly dependent on his system. 'rhose of the other opin-
ion argue that Suarez misht have wanted to be but a corr~entator 
of St. 'rho:::tas, yet the wide divergence which he makes with his 
great predecessor forces him into a system of llis own. Perhaps 
the most convincing argument that we have for t'J.e latter view is 
that taken from Kl~-::-'~~::e in his Historiae Philosophiae: 
Ceterum, ut ex epistola Suaresii ad 1eneralem. Iv~utium 
Vitelleshi ex anno 1617 apparet, consilium ei erat 
completum cursum systematicum totius philosophiae 
componere, et quidem probabiliter sequendo eandem 
methodurn quam in Disputa tioni bus Metaphysic is tenuit. 9 
If this problem were settled, then we mipht ask what place 
t~e modes have in this system. Are they as basic to Suarez as 
Act and Potency are to St. Thomas? Here a[ain we have a diver-
gence of opinion. At one extreme we have Hoenen who calls the 
modes unintelligible. This he states in the minor of his proof 
ff Deberweg, Weber, Bartrnann, Glenn. 
that ubi does not consist of a modus intrinl?_ecus realis praevius 
ex quo resultat contactus ~ locQ. 
Atqui n:.odus intrinsecus :praevius contactui locali sup-
poni tur ad ra tionem reddendar:1 pro:pinqui ta tis et dis-
tantiae10quae in se sunt clarae dmn ipse modus intelligi 
nequit. 
A Perez Goyena in his article on Suarez in the Cat~olic Zncyclo-
.redia_ lists the twelve chief principles in his system. Amonp: 
these the modes are not included. 'l'here are others, who while 
not denying the importance of the modes, claim other things are 
more basic in Suarez' metaphysics. Geny states that Suarez' 
analogy of a ttribu+.ion j ~ hj_s fundamental doc trine: "'l'ota eius 
metaphysica treoria analogiae entis pendere videtur."ll 
However, in pursuing the pases of the Disputationes lieta-
physicae the frequent use of the !!lodes is strikinr. The rnere 
numerical frequency of them demands that they be considered 
important. Many authors, although they do not explicitly state 
it, yet implicitly imply that the modes of' Suarez are at least 
essential to his system because of their wide and varied use. 
T. Pesch, for example, devotes a thesis in his Lop-ic.a .fiaior to 
prove their existence: 
Non sine ratione a.ffirrnant, esse in rebus modos physicos 
sive reales, qui a rebus modificatis, quibus insint, 
distincti sint distinctione reali rrinore.l2 
Urraburul3 and Lossadal4 devote several pap-es to the explanation 
of the mode and apply it to the other categories. 
It is, indeed, disappointin[!: to have to leave the problem 
here, but it is sufficient for one who wants to study the modes 
.. 
themselves to know that their place and importance in Suarezie.n 
metaphysics is a disputed one. We hope, however, by the evidenc 
of our study to advance the theory which admits that the modes 
are at least intellipible, and to show from Suarez' frequent use 
of t:::em that they are essential to an understr~ndinc of his meta-
physics. 
Let us proceed then to this stu.c.y of the n:odes. Suarez 
first makes mention of the modes in treatinp the modal distinc-
tion. To have a full understanding of them we must first study 
this distinction. 
'rHE IuODAL DISTINCTION 
Betvveen the two main distinctions of being, real and ratio-
nal, some p"lilosophers have seen the need for a mean. Scotus 
postulated his distinctio formalis a 0nrte rei. ~o Suarez this 
proposal seemed inadequate, so he postulated his modal distinc-
tion. 
Secunda sententia est, dari in rebus quamdam distinc-
tionem actualem ante intellectum, quae proinde non est 
rationis, sed major illa, neque etiam est tanta distinc-
tio quanta est realis inter rem et rem. Haec sententie. 
cor:1muniter tribuitur Scoto.l5 
Suarez explains why he rejected Scotus's distinction and offered 
his own. 
There exists in nature independently of the operation of th 
mind an actual distinction in created things, he says, but this 
distinction is not so great as that which is found between two 
separate entities. This distinction may be called real in the 
~eneral sense of the term in as much as it is in the actual orde 
and is not purely an extrinsic denomination that issues from the 
intellect. To distinguish it, however, from the zreater dis-
tinction -- major distinctio realis -- it is called an imperfect 
distinction or, more properly, a modal distinction. The reason 
for this latter name is that this distinction always intervenes 
between a thinr:: and its mode. To call this distinction a formal 
distinction, as Scotus does, is not to Suarez' liking, since it 
seems to him the term is equivocal. He proceeds to give his 
reasons. The forrr~l distinction is sometimes applied to things 
that differ b~r reason of their essence; moreo~ter even individual 
of the sallie species can be called formally distinct since they 
have their formal individual entities. 'l'hus a formal distinc-
tion is of wlder extension ann can be greater than the mean 
distinction. Jl.lso, the formal distinction can be a lesser dis-
tinction and this is the more common as it is frequently applied 
to formalities conceived in a state of precision by our intellec 
and consequently where we have a purely mental distinction. 
Nihilominus censeo, simpliciter verum esse dari in rebus 
creatis aliquam distinctionem actualem, ex natura rei, 
ante aperationem intellectus, quae non sit tanta, quanta 
est inter duas res, seu entitates ornnino distinctas, 
quae distinctio, qu~mvis generali vocabulo possit vocari 
realis, quia vere est a parte rei, et non est per denom-
ina ti')l10.r,: extrinsecam ab intellectu, tamen ad distin£:11-
endum illan: ab alia majori distinctione reali, possumus 
illam appellare, vel distinctionem ex natura rei, ap-
plicand.o illi tanquam imperfectiori cenerale nomen, vel 
proprius vocari potest distinctio no~alis: quia ver-
satur semper inter rer.'l aliquam, et modus eius. Homen 
autem distinctionis formalis non ita mild placet, quia 
est valde aequivocmn; saepe enim convenit rebus real-
iter distinctis, quatenus inter se diversas unitates 
formales, et ita etiam forrJ.ali ter differunt. Imo et 
individua eiusdem speciei, quatenus distinctas habent 
unitates formales individua 
distingui ••• Sic ergo distinctio formalis latius patet, 
et major esse potest quam distinctio ex natura rei, de 
qua nunc loquimur. Aliunde vero etiam potest esse minor, 
et ita est co11rrrmnior, quia frequenter applica tur ad 
rationes formales, ut conceptas et praecisas per intel-
lectum nostrum, et tunc illa distinctio non transcendit 
gradQm distinctionis rationis.l6 
For these reasons, then, our author excludes Scotus 1 s 
denomination of such a mean distinction. He calls it rather a 
modal distinction for the reason given above, namely, because it 
designates the distinction between a thing and its mode. 
The modes are the bases in reality for this modal distinc-
tion. It c~nnot be understood without a thoroue:h study of the 
~odes. We will now proceed to this study. 
1 
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CBAPT.2R I 
DEFINITION OF A I-LODE AND Al~ EXPLANATIOI\ OF ITS TlliWIS 
At the outset we must realize that Suarez was not the first 
to use the modes. Other eminent philosophers before him such as 
Durandus, Aegidius, and Fonseca seen to have admitted them. 
Suarez gives as a confirmatory argument that the modes exist, th 
fact that these men postulated them. 
Denique hos modos videtur a3novisse Durand., in 1. dist. 
30, quaest. 2, nm:1 .• 15, ubi loquens de esse in, seu 
inhaerentia accidentis, dicit esse respect~~, qui anal-
ogice dicitur res vel ens, quia non est res, sed modus 
essendi, neque est entitas habens modum, sed modus tan-
tum entitatis; idem dicit de dependentia, et de ornni eo 
quod est solQ~ modus essendi. Et eodem modo loquitur 
de inhaerentia Astudil., 1 de Gener ••.• quaest. 5, ad 
1. Et in particulari tractando de subsistentia, ita 
illam. explicant multi, ut Aegid., tit. de Corr..posit. 
Aneel., q. 5. Ac denique Fonseca, lib. 5 :r,:etaph., cap. 
6, quaest. 6, sect. 2, hos modos expresse ponit, quamvis 
distinguat tria genera modorum ••• l 
However, Suarez was the first to popularize the modes and 
to use them extensively in his works. The question is what did 
they mean to Suarez? 
The word mode is a queer mocable that conjures up many dif-
ferent phantasms in our minds. In our day it has quite a variet'J 
of meanings. The English dictionary gives seven different defin-
itions. In Suarez' day the word also had various shades of mean-
ing. To avoid any confusion the philosopher gives examples of 
modes which are frequently used by other philosophers, but which 
do not have the meaning he attaches to the word in this study. 
Here are some of the things a mode is not. 
~ben one concept deterr.1ines or limits another in any way, 
'""' 
we call it a mode of the latter. Thus, if there is no real 
distinction between the determinine and the determined thought 
object, the mode is called a metaphysical mo6e; e.6., as ration-
ality is of animality in man. This word is especially applied 
to those modes by which a ueing or accident is determined to the 
most universal e;enus. Neither is this word taken in that gener-
al sense in which every determination is wont to be called a 
mode. lJor in the sense in which the fixed limitation of any 
finite thing is its mode ae·cording to its measure. In this sensE 
it is used by St. 'l1homa.s when quoting from St. Augustine: Modus 
est ~ mensura praefigit. Again, created things are all "mode. 
of being; 11 and the various aspects of a creature rr..ay be called 
"modes" of creatures; as abaleitas is a mode of every created 
being, or as quantity has the mode of inaleitas as regards a 
substance. In none of these senses do we use the word "mode" in 
this thesis • 
••• inhaerentiam, appella~us modum quantitatis, non quidem 
illa generali significatione, qua oranis qualitas solet 
modus substantiae appellari, ut ait D. Thomas, I,2, q.49, 
art. 2. Neque etiam illa generali loquendi ratione, quo 
omne contrahens vel determinans solet appellari modus 
contracti; sic enim rationale dici potest modus animalis, 
et specialiter solet haec vox applicari ad illos modos, 
quibus determinatur ens vel accidens ad genera general-
issima. Neque etiam sumitur haec vox in illa general-
itate, qua modus dici solet omnis determinatio; vel lim-
itatio praefixa unicuique rei finitae juxta mensuras eius, 
ut eodem loco notavit D. Thomas ex Aue~stino, lib. 4, 
Genes. ad litteram2 cap. 3, dicente: Modus est guem mansura praefigit. 
By a mode Suarez did mean: the ultimate determination of an 
entity, which is itself not an entity and~ not nothing, 
I I 
rather it is a positive reality which if it exists rrust deter-
~ an entity, since ~ mode is not able to exist separatelz.3 
From the pen of other authors interpreting Suarez we have 
a variety of definitions of the mode. 
Lossada says the following is a suitable enough -- satis 
idonea -- description of the mode. 
one: 
Realis et ultima determinatio condistinctae a se indiffer-
entiae ad aliquam denominationem rei existentis propriam.4 
Urraburu after rejecting many other definitions gives this 
Bntitas vel realitas R. subjecto ree.liter distinct& cuius 
totum esse consistit in ultima determinations rei ad 
aliquod munus obeundum vel ad aliquam realem denomin-
ationem actu habendam, sine qua saltern in individuo 
sumpta, res eadem potest existere absolute.5 
Nolan in his treatise on the modes gives these two points 
as rr.taking up the nature of the mode: 
1. The ultimate thou~h real determination of a reality. 
2. It does not add a new entity but merely modifies a 
preexisting entity.6 
T. Pesch in :Lis thesis on the modes defines them thus: 
11odus rea lis descri bi tur ali quid posi ti vum afficiens 
ipsam rei enti ta tem, cui u.s est modus, per s eipsuu1 dando 
ei aliquid, quod est extra rei entitatem ut determinans 
dm~taxat statQ~ et rationem existendi eius, non tamen 
addens illi propriam entitatem novara, sed solum modif-
icans praeexistentem.7 . 
Bittle in his Ontology has this to say about the mode: 
A 'mode' is the actual determination of a being which is 
indifferent toward this or that determination, but with-
out the mode adding a new entity to it through the mod-
ification. It is of such a nature that it confers no 
new entity upon its subject and is distinguished from 
'nothing' ttll'ou;~h and in its subject only; the suhject 
can exist without a particular mode, but the mode cannot 
exist outside the sub·ect which it modifi A ' 
more than a mere logical being, and as such is more than 
a fabrication of the mind; it really affects the subject, 
independent of the mind, by determining the indifferent 
subject to a definite manner of being or existence.8 
One last authority's description of the mode may be added: 
(A mode) is some positive reality which so affects another 
and distinct reality as to detennine the latter proximate-
ly to some definite way of existing or acting, to which 
the latter is itself indifferent; without however adding 
to the latter any new and nroner entitv other tr~n the 
said determination.9 • " ~ 
This galaxy of definitions from reliable authorities has 
been presented to assemble in one work the outstandin[" defini-
tions of the ~ode. However, let us go back to the first defin-
i tion which was taken from the Disnuta tiones l:etaphysica.e, and 
which uses the words of Suarez himself. If we inspect this 
definition and take it phrase by phrase its meaning will become 
clearer. 
TERI.~S OP THE DBFINI'TION EXPlAINED 
a. The ultimate determination of~ entity. Creatures 
because they are finite are very weak. Therefore when they are 
in the act of causing, actu primq proximo e.g., to being in 
place, ubi, they need an ultimate determination or mode. This 
mode removes the indifference which a body has for being here or 
there, in this position or that, etc. For instance, inherence 
is called a mode of quantity because it is somethine affecting 
it, and as it were, ultimately detennining the state and essence 
of the quantity's existence. 
Cun1 creaturae sint imperfectae, ideoque vel dependentes 
vel composi tae, vel limi ta tae, vel mutabiles secundUL.'l 
varios status praesentiae, unionis, aut terminationis, 
indigent his modis quibus haec omnia in ipsis compleantur.lO 
••• appellatur inhaerentia quantitatis modus eius, quia 
est aliquid illam afficiens, et quasi ultimo determinans 
statum, et rationem existendi eius.ll 
b. A mode itself is not~ entity and~ is not nothing. 
This is true because the essence of the modes seems to consist 
in this that they themselves are not sufficient to constitute a 
being or entity in the real order of things, but intrinsecally 
den:and that they actually determine some entity, without which 
they are in no way able to exist. A mode is not really a~ entit 
unless by an entity is meant whatever is not nothing. Nor is a 
mode an entity, if by entity is meant that which does not demand 
that it always be united to another, and secondly if it is 
united to something it must be ur1ited by means of a mode distinc 
fro::-n itself. It is l:ere that we best see the imperfection of th 
mode, for the mode has just the opposite properties. First, it 
must always be connected with another; second, it is immediately 
united to an entity without the means of another mode, as sessio 
is to one sitting, unio to things united • 
••• modum hunc non esse proprie rem seu entitatem, nisi 
late et generalissime vocando ens, quicquid non est 
nihil; trunen sumendo entitatem pro illa re, quae ex se 
et in se ita est aliquid, ut non postulet OL1nino intrin-
sece et essentialiter esse semper affixam alteri, sed 
vel non sit alteri unibilis, vel saltem uniri non possit, 
nisi medio aliquo modo a se ex natura rei distincto, 
modus non est proprie res seu entitas, et in hoc eius 
imperfectio optime declaratur, quod semper esse debet 
affixus alteri, cui per se inwediate unitur sine medio 
alio modo, ut sessio sedenti, unio rebus unitis.l2 
c. Rather a mode is a positive reality wl1ich if it exists 
~ determine an entity. That is, even before the operation of 
the mind there are in created things real rr~odes which are dis-
tinct from their entities and deter:::nine the entities throue:h 
themselves by giving the created things something which is over 
and above their whole essence. 
Suppono in rebus creatis, praeter entitates earum, quasi 
substantiales, vel radicales (ut ita dica1n) inveniri 
quosdam modes reales qui et svnt aliquid positivum, et 
afficiunt ipsas entitates per seipsos, dando illis ali-
quid, quod est extra essenti~~ totam, ut individuam, et 
existente!'ll in reru:..rn natura .13 
This, then, is a mode: that which ultimately determines 
a reality, while at the same time it does not add a proper en-
tity of its own, but only modifies a preexisting one. Of itself 
it is not sufficient to constitute a being or entity in the real 
order, but intrinsecally demands that it actually affect some 
entity without which it is in no way able to exist. It is not 
a being: it is not nothing: it is a reality.l4 
Suarez gives an analogy to show just what is the nature of 
t:'le r:1.ode. Light depends on the sun. This dependence, however, 
is something other than the light and the sun. We could under-
stand how both the light and the sun :milh.t continue without the 
lisht's dependence on the sun on the supposition that God were 
to deny his concursus to the sun for producine; light, while at 
the same time He conserved in existence by His ovm power both 
the li~ht and the sun. The mind, however, cannot conceive this 
dependence of the light on the sun to be an entity wholly dis-
tinct from the light itself because, firstly, by this dependence 
as through a mediu..11 the cause exerts its influence on the effect 
and secondly, this entity could otherwise be separated from its 
subject, at least by the absolute power of God, which is unin-
telligible. Therefore we conclude this dependence is a mode of 
liE{ht which has a transcendental relation to its subject. ':!:'here 
fore, there are in created entities modes modifyinc these enti-
ties, whose reason for existlnr consists in this that they them-
selves, of themselves, are not sufficient to constitute a being 
or entity in the real order of things but are intrinsically or-
dained to actually modify some entity without v!Thich they can in 
no wise exist. 15 
Lossada, the best co:mt;lenta tor on Suarezian metaph.ysics, 16 
gives this exar.1ple: 
Take Peter sitting in his chair. The sittingness of Peter 
is a reality; it is not simply nothine- or a fiction of 
the mind that Peter is in this state. l\"oreover it is 
distinct from Peter; otherwise Peter could not exist 
unless he were sitting. It also really modifies Peter, 
since sittingness is the ultimate deter::11ination that 
places Peter in this condition. And finally the fact 
that sittingness cannot exist by itself is shown in 
this, that it could not be conceived if Peter himself 
does not exist. This and similar determinations, of 
things themselves indifferent to one or another function, 
are real ~~ysical modes.l7 
We conclude this chapter with two examples given by a mod-
ern Ar-~~ic~n philosopher. 
Place a coin on the table, with its face dovmi"!c.rd; and 
then reverse it, with its face upwarC.. 'Pl:ere is a real 
difference of position here, and it really affects the 
coin, independent of all thoucht; but the different pos-
itions add no new entity to the coin as such. You cannot 
separate this position of tt:.e coin fror1. the coin itself; 
the coin is indifferent to various positions, but each 
position zives a definite mode to the coin. Or, take a 
lump of modeling clay and shape it, first into a sphere, 
and then into a cube. This shaping 1:r1erely shifts the 
outer limits or boundaries of the quantity of the clay 
without addins any new entity to the quantity itself: 
the shape (sphere, cube, cone, etc.) is nothing but a 
'mode' of the quantity (extension) of a body, in as much 
as it f'i ves determination to this quantity which, of it-
self, is indifferent to various shapes. These shapes, 
though, are distinct, because they differ amont: them-
selves and actually modify the subject.l8 
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CBAPTE.i\ II 
PROOF THAT 'l'IlE I·:iODLS EXIST 
That these modes which Suarez postulates actually exist can 
be proved ~ priori and by induction. First we will take the 
proof from induction. 
In examining the things of this world Suarez found the need 
of postulating modes. In considering, for instance, the acciden 
of quantity two things can be noticed: (1) the accident may be 
viewed in itself just as it exists with all its essential prop-
erties. If we look at quantity in this way, it is as it would 
be, detached from the subject of its inherence, a table for in-
stance. If it were separated from the table, it would still 
keep all of its essential properties. This same accident may be 
considered from another point of view, na"nely, its actual inher-
ence in the table. The quantity which before was considered in 
itself now has something new. It has in fact a new mode of ex-
istence. This inherence actually adds so:methinr;r new to the quan 
ti ty, gives it the ultimate finishing "fashion, 11 as J:i'a ther 
Harper says, of its existence. It does not add any new entity 
to the entity of the quantity, but previous to any operation of 
the intellect, it modifies the preexisting state of the quantity 
This function Suarez calls a "mode." 
Hoc pa tet inductione: nam, verbi r;ra tia, in quanti te. te, quae 
est in substantia, duo conslderari possunt: unmn est, 
entitas ipsius quantitatis: aliud est unio seu actualis 
inhaerentia eiusdem quanti ta tis cum substantia. Prim1.:r.n 
vocanms sLnplici ter rem quanti tat is, includentem quic-
quid est de essentia quantitatis lr:tdividuae, et in rerum 
natura positae, quod manet et conservatur, etiansi quan-
titas a sub"ecto seoaretur et im 
illa:rtt rem nu..rnero, quae est haec quanti tas, q1::.in includa t 
hance essentiam quantitatis cum sua intrinseca individu-
atione, et actuali esse •.•• appellatur inhaerentia quan-
titatis modus eius, quia est aliq11id illam afficiens, et 
quasi ultimo determinans statun, et rationem existendi 
eius, non tamen addit illi :;;ropriam entitatem novam, sed 
soluxn "nodificat praeexistentem.l 
It may be objected that this mode is an entity in itself. 
On closer exa1:1ination it will be found that this is not so. •r:1e 
proble~;1 may be looked at negatively. It is inpossible for the 
~odes to be an entity because then there would result an infin-
i te series. First, t.here is the mode which unites the quantity 
and the subst:nce; then, this mode (which in the supposition is 
an entity) would need something by which it in turn would be 
united to the substance and quantity, just as the original quan-
tity needed a mode to unite it to the substance, and so to 
infinity. 
In reality, however, inherence does not need another union. 
Its very essence is to u~ite. Inherence is not, therefore, an 
entity which inheres but only a certain mode v.r:'~.ich of itself is 
the reason for t~e union or inherence. 
If we take the example of tbe quantity and the table, we 
can see that this is true. rne inherence by which the quantity 
is joined to the table could never exist separately by itself. 
This fact, that it is able to affect only the quantity which it 
is uni tine· to the table, proves that it has not its ov:n entity. 
A form which has its own entity never determines a thing ult-
i:cr12. t ely in the way in which this mode does. 
r 
Na:::n quod novam entitatem propriam non afferGt, vix potest 
in dubi ta tionem venire, qv_ia si esset nova onnino e?Jti-
tas, non posset esse actualis unio inter quantitatem et 
subject~, secl ipsa :potius indi,c:-eret, quo subjecto unir-
etur et quanti ta ti, sicut quanti b::j_g i?sa indi2,ct in:!::J.aer-
entia, qua subjecto uniatur. Quod si inhaerentia non 
incliset alia unione vel inhaerentia qua uniatur vel in-
haereat, ideo est quia ipsa per se non affert propriam 
entitate:::n, qu&.e inhaereat et uniatur, sed est tantu::n 
quidam modus, qui per se est ratio unionis et inhaerentiae. 
Cuius si5num etiam est, quia haec inhaerentia habet talem 
modum essendi, ut per nullam potentiam esse possit nisi 
actu conjuncta ei for~ae, cuius est iru1aerentia, et quod 
haec inhaerentia numero non potest afficere seu potius 
unire nisi hanc numero for:nar.J., cui est veluti affixa, 
qui rnodus afficiendi mnnquam reperitur in h~s formis vel 
rebus, qui proprias ex se habent entitates. 
Now for the a priori proof. 
Suarez upon studying reality was impressed with the weak-
ness and imperfections of creatures. Accidents depending on 
substances, incomplete substs_nces depending on each other, and 
the continual flux of things made him look a priori for somethin , 
which would give an ultimate determination to these creatures 
w~ich of themselves they did not have. 
This view was not new or startling for the Thomist had also 
realized this weakness of creatures and postulated essence and 
existence to do his determining. 
Upon further reflection it was found that the thing v;hich 
brought about these effects of union, linlitation, composition, 
etc., could not result from something wllich of itself was an 
entity. Yet, clearly it was not nothing-. Eodes, then, must be 
postulated to explain these effects. 
A priori aute-1~ esse videtur, quia, c-u:::~ crea turae sint 
imperfectae, ideoque vel dependentes, vel compositae, 
vel lLai ta tae, vel :mutabiles secundum varios status 
r 
praesentiae, unionis, aut terminationis, indigent his 
r:1odis quibus haec omnia in ipsis compleantur. Quia nee 
per entitates om.nino distinctas hoc semper fieri necesse 
est, imo nee conmode intellici potest: neque etiam fieri 
potest per id, quod sit gnmino nihil, et ideo saltern 
requiritur modus realis. 
On these two proofs Suarez rests the reality of his modes. 
T. Pesch in the thesis on the modes gives a fuller proof. 
neal modes exist (1) if there is no contradiction in the 
concept or nature of the modes; (2) if there is a reason which 
a J2riori demands that there be modes; (3) if many of the accid-
ents which c..re found in this universe of created thin,"'s are not 
able to be explained unless real modes are postulated. 
Fr. Pesch then proceeds to take each of these points in 
turn and proves them. 
(1) I'here is no contradiction. 'l'here is no repugnance sine 
accidents in their very concept are so weak that they are not 
able to be conceived nor exist unless as modifications of real 
beinss. 
( 2) 'I'here are certain reasons which persuade us that real 
~odes do exist in things: (a) Creatures, since they are finite, 
chan,seable and indeterminate, need these various modes. (b) 
I,~oreover, the order in nature especially postulates that there 
be this grade of being in things. Thus, besides the Esse actu 
in se and a Se, which is the divine Esse, this scale of being 
is found: {i) Esse which is actu in se but nevertheless not a 
~; this is substance. {ii) Esse actu in another being; this is 
a real accident. (iii) Esse actu by modifying another; this is 
real relation. (v) Zsse in potency only; this is a possible. 
(vi) Esse which can exist objectively in the mind only; this is 
an e_11.s rationis .. (c) Just as a!"l_ Hbsolute and necessary being 
fronl its very nature demands that it be sufficient unto itself, 
since it is Lmautable, so the very nature of created things and 
contingent beings demands that they be themselves under every 
aspect mutable. 
. Thus, substances themselves not only by their nature have 
ceneration and corruption, but also as long as they last in 
tt1eir esse substantials they are chanred again and again in 
t~eir esse accidentale, so that in substances not only real 
accidents coMe and go, but rc.oreover event he substance with its 
accidents is subject to many and almost continual cr~nges. Es-
pecially is this true with regard to space and time through 
local motion. Hence we learn that all thin~s placed in this 
visible world are in perpetual motion. But no local motion 
would be real u!lless these modes were real which are called 
ubilocationes fluentes, and guandocationes fluentes, which are 
conti!lually coming and going in things. 
Fr. Pesch proves his third point, namely, that many acci-
dents cannot be explained without postulating the modes. 
(3) There are many things in nature from which we can con-
elude to the reality of the modes. 
(a) First of all from the chan0:es in things. Certainly we 
experience in ourselves and in thinfs outside of ourselves var-
ious and continual changes. But where there is chanrre there is .,_. 
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newness; where there is newness there is either the receiving 
of a habitus not yet P~d, or the loss of a habitus. Therefore, 
there is no true change in a thing except when it either loses 
or newly acquires something which intrinsecally affects that 
thing in the real order. But no part of a thine is ever changed 
by nothing, or by an ens rationis. Therefore every real true 
cbange in a thing is able to be conceived only as a true and 
real distinction which intercedes between the subject of the 
change and that which is lost or gained. It is not possible, 
however, universally to affirm that that which recedes or is 
acquired is always an entity properly speaking whether substan-
ti~l or accidental. 
Fr. Pesch then gives a few examples of this latter type of 
chanf"e, such as bending a fincer in which the fundament and term 
of this relation make no loss or gain to the entity of the fin-
ger. Therefore, he concludes, nothing is left but to say that 
in this type of change there is constantly a go:!..ns and coming of 
different modes. 
(b) 'I'he second argument is taken from the true efficacy of 
causes. In every tr-ue efficient cause it is required that some-
t:linz be produced which before was not. 3ut very often we see 
a cause act which neither produces any substantial nor accidenta 
entity. If therefore it does not produce a mode it does not 
produce anything.4 Now that we have established the reality of 
the modes, we may take up an important phase of them: the div-
ision into Accidental and Substantial modes. 
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CHA.PTEH. III 
TYPES OF 1.=oD:c;S 
'11he modes fall naturally into three types: a substantial 
mode of being, an accidental mode of being, and an accidental 
~ode of being which falls under a predicament other than that 
of which it is a mode. Each of these will be explained in order 
3ut before taking them up a difficulty which arises as soon as 
there is mention of different types of modes must be cleared up. 
:Eow can a mode be a substance or an accident when it has already 
been said tbat it is not a being? One may argue -- substance 
and accidents is a complete division of being; but modes have no 
proper entity; therefore they cannot be included in this div-
ision. 
This, nevertheless, is false. For Aristotle and other 
philosophers tell us that many thinzs are nu.:rnbered among the 
accidents which are only modes of being, as figure, place, and 
others of this kind. 
That this is so is clear, because a really complete divisio 
of being is composed of created and uncreated being. This em-
braces on the one hand uncreated beinc, and on the other what-
ever is not nothing, that is, whatever has some real essence or 
formality in the real order. 'I'herefore, created beinc: includes 
everythin~ which is either not altogether nothinr: and is outside 
of God. ;rhe modes, however, are not nothinf!, but have a real 
essence which is proportioned to the:msel ves. T!:terefore, they 
are either substance or accidents. 
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Primum est, an modus entis qui ex natura rei distinruitur 
ab illa re, cuius est modus, sub hac divisione cornprehen-
datur, et ad quod illius membrum pertineat. Et quidem 
propter argurn.entum factum existimare quis posset, hos 
modos non contineri sub diviso huius divisionis, et 
ideo necessarium non esse ut aliquod ex membris dividen-
tibus illis conveniat. Hi enim modi non habent propriam 
entitatem et realitatem, et ideo neque entia dici pos-
sunt, sed solum modi entium; cum err:o divisum huius div-
isionis sit ens, non complectitur hos modos, et ideo nee 
accidentia erunt, nee substantiae. Verumtamen hie J.'lodus 
dicendi falsus est, nam constat, ab Aristotele, et aliis 
philosophis, multa inter accidentia nQmerari, quae solum 
sunt modi entium, ut figura, ubi, et alia huiusmodi; de 
quibus suis 1ocis videbimus. Et ratio est, quia ens 
creatum prout absolute distinguitur ab increato, com-
plectitur quidquid non est nibil, sed aliquam realem 
essentiam, seu formalitatem habet in rerum natura; hoc 
enim tot~~ complectitur ens creabile transcendentaliter 
et in tota sua latitudine sumptum; ergo etiam ens cre-
atUJ'l aL'l.bit omnia quae non sunt omnir0 nihil, et extra 
Deurn sunt; hi aut em modi reales non sunt ni:Oil, sed 
suas reales essentias habent sibi proportionatas; con-
tinentur ergo sub diviso huius divisionis.l 
Havinp: proved that modes can be eitt.er substance or accid-
ents, it can now be determined under which of these caterrories 
the various nodes fall. 
~he division of the modes is a natural one; substantial and 
accidental modes. 'l1hus, whatever is a mode of a substance is a 
substantial mode, whatever is a mode of an accident is an accid-
ental mode. As an exn.mple of the former: the mode of union be-
tween the matter and form is itself a substance and is called a 
substantial mode. We shall see more about this mode when we 
treat of the practical application of the modes. ~he inherence 
of the quantity in the table is an example of the absolute accid 
ental mode. In general the modes come under the same category 
as ·those thin['S of which tlJey are modes. This cannot be said 
universally, for there is the third tv.pe of mode which we have_ 
mentioned above, namely those modes which do not partake of the 
essence of the thins: which they modify. Tl:.is type is aY)plied to 
tbe accidents of ubi, te11~nus, situs, habitus, acti~, and nassio. 
'l1r:.ey are modes of sor:1e complete substance or one of the absol-
L:<te accidents, yet form a peculiar predicament of their O\"'TI. 
Aliter ern:o dici potest, hos modos entiurn revocari ad 
renera rermn quarcll!l sunt modi, et curn quibus habent 
realem identitatem, ita ut modus substantia.e revocetur 
ad substantiam, et sit substantia salterr.. incompleta; 
modus vero accidentis sit accidens, et ad illud 1'3enus 
accidentis rev-Jcet~J.::.", lD quo fueri t ipsum accidens 
cuius est talis modus. Sed neque haec sententia in 
universun: vermn habet; nam, licet interdum ita con-
tingat, quod modus rei participet illam rationem sub-
stantiae, vel accidentis, quae est in re cuius est 
modus, non est 2.utem hoc semper veru."'Yl; nam figura est 
modus quantitatis, et tamen non participat rationem 
quantitatis, sed qualitatis, et similiter· Ubi est modus 
quantitatis vel substantiae, et tamen nee est substa::1tia, 
nee quanti tas, sed peculiare genus ac praedicar'enturn. 
constituit.2 
Now that it has been seen where the r1odes of beins ought 
to be placed, each division can be taken more in detail. Let us 
be~in with the mode of a substanc~. 
It is known that everything wl::.ich constitutes or eoes to 
rr.ake up the essence of a substance is ttself a substance. But 
a mode which rr:odifies a substance partakes of the essence of 
that substance. Therefore, a substantial mode is itself a sub-
stance. That, for instance, which gives the ultimate determin-
ation to uironness" is a substance and is called a substantial 
rn.ode. 'rhis is so because a complete substance is an unum per se 
and is composed of nothine but substances or substance. ~his 
san:e reasoninr; holds good for incomplete substEmces. A mode 
w:r;ich modifies an incomnlete substance is itself an in 
r 
r substance. F'or the incomplete substance is just the imperfect 
existence or part of an actual substance. Suarez gives the 
exm!lple of r:1.atter and form: take the union of matter with sub-
stantial forn, or of fort1 with matter. Each is of itself or-
dained to make up a complete substance, and is intrinsically 
included in the com~1osite substance. '.i.'herefore the union of 
r.:a tter with for:m. is a substantial mode. 3 This is why a sub-
stantial mode is a substance and not an accident • 
••• nam substantia completa, cum sit ens per se unum, et 
in suo genere absolutun non nisi ex substantie vel sub-
stantiis constat: quidquid ergo intrinsece concurrit ad 
constitutione~ substantiam saltem inconpletam esse 
necesse est. Item substantia incompleta nihil aliud est, 
nisi vel substantia ista in aliquo esse imperfecto, vel 
id quod est pars, seu complementmn substantiae; er0o 
omnis modus, qui ita conc,xrri t ad consti tutione1a sub-
stantiae, est substantia incompleta, s eu modus sub-
stantialis, et non est accidens.4 
'rhe next type is the accidental mode. That mode is accid-
ental vvbich supposes the thing of which it is a :tilode, is a com-
plete substance. If we take the example of the table, it will 
be seen why this is true. 'l'he table witb. its matter and form 
is a co:::nplete substance. Once it is complete as e. substance, 
all the other things added to it, such as its color, shape, 
position, etc., are but accidents. Novv the modes which are 
identified with these accidents must also be accidents. I'hus 
the inherence of quantity in the table is something added to the 
table after it is a complete substance, and therefore this ult-
imate determination of the extension of the table is an accident 
It already supposes the completion of the substance. I\1odes of 
this tyne are accidental modes 
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De ratione accidentis est ut supponat subjectum suum; 
ere;o modus, qui non supponi t, sed complet subste.ntiam 
non est accidens. Atque hinc patet ratio alterius par-
tis; nam postquarn substantia jaw est plene in suo gen-
ere constituta, quidquid ei additur, sive sit res, sive 
modus, est accidens eius; sed modus qv.i nullo modo spec-
tat ad complementum substantiae, ex se supl;oni t illam 
plene constitutam in suo genere; est ergo accidens eius. 
r:rajor constat, tu.:::1 ex comr::mni ratione accicientis, tun 
etiam. quia si modus adveniens substantiae non est acci-
dens, sed aliquid substantiale, erso complet amplius, 
et quasi magis inte;2;rat ipsam substantiam cuius est 
modus; ergo talis modus non su.pponit substantiarn plene 
constitutam; erc;o si eam sic constitu.tam su.pponit talis 
modus, non eri t substantialia, sed acc·identalis. 5 
This can be nade clearer by two exe.mples given by Suarez. 
In angelic substances which are already complete as subsistent 
beings we find a mode of ubi. This is not a substantial mode, 
because when the ubi of the ane;el is changed there is no sub-
stantial change in the ·angel. 'I'he ubi does not pertain to the 
constitution or complement of an angelic substance. 
Or a~ain, theolocians speak of the sacramental presence of 
the Body of Christ in the Eucr.:.arist as beint-: placed under the 
genus of local presence. I'his presence is an accidental mode of 
that Body because in no way does it pertain to the substantial 
cornpibsi tion of It. 6 
In this division of the modes we now treat the third kind. 
It is the type of mode which does not fall under the same cat-
e;~ory as the accident which it modifies. That this is true may 
easily be seen by a;JplyinG; the same rule here which was given 
above for the distinction between a substantial and an acciden-
tal mode. As with the substance its mode was substantial when 
it was of the essence of tl1e subject or helped complete it; so 
r here when a mode helps an accident carry out its formal effect, 
and partakes of the essence of the accident, it is called an 
absolute accidental mode. But if, as we saw above, the mode 
which modifies the substance supposes that the substance is al-
ready complete, it is an accidental mode of that substance. So 
here, if the mode supposes tb.e accident which it modifies is 
com.plete, then of itself it r...as a peculiar nature of its own and 
constitutes a new predicament. I'his mode modifies the subject 
either by its own efficiency, or by means of sorr•.e other accident 
Ex dictis facile respondere est ad aliam partem, ••• 
quando modus, qui est accidens, reducatur ad aliud genus 
accidentis, vel novUl!l p:enus consti tua t. E~den:. enim fere 
regula, quara de modis su.bstantialibus tradidimus, appli-
canda hie est. Na.rn interdum accidentalis modus solum 
est ad complementurn. alterius accidentis, seu ad exer-
cendu.~ affectum formalem eius, et tunc modus accidental-
is non consti tui t novu.m genus seu praedicamenturn acci-
dentis, sed ad illud reducitur, ad cuius complementu."'ll 
per'tinet; nam in eo genera quid incompletum est. Quando 
vero modus accidentalis non spectat ad complementum, vel 
constitutionem alterius accidentis, sed per sese pecul-
iari ~odo afficit substantias, vel i~uediate, vel medio 
ali quo accident a, tunc per se habet peculiarem. ra tioner.1 
accidentis, et novum praedicamentum, vel proprium genus 
ali cui us praedic&I:J.enti cons ti tui t. 7 
Suarez gives an example of each of these two modes. (1) It 
can be seen when an accidental mode falls under the sa1ne predi-
cament as the accident of which it is a mode. Thus, the inher-
ence of quantity in a substance is a mode really distinct from 
quantity since in the Eucharist it is separated from quantity. 
This mode, however, does not constitute a new predicament but is 
reduced to the predicament of quantity because it intrinsically 
constitutes quantity and helps quantity to exercise its formal 
effect. The same can be said for the i nhAY'Anf'A r.f' rm!'\1; hr A 
" 
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(2) It can be seen when a mode falls under a predicament other 
than that of which it is an accident. Figure, although it is a 
:·,1ode of quantity is not contained under the predicament of quan-
tity, but belongs to the genus of quality. Likewise ubi is 
another mode of quantity which constitutes a new predicament. 
'rhe reason for this is that such modes do not aO.d. to the formal 
effect of quantity nor to its integrity or constitution, but 
have a new and special way of affectinc quantity.9 
The general rule for these tr,ree types can be summed up 
tlms: just as that which composes or completes a substance is 
an incon;plete substance, whether it be a part or a mode of the 
substance, so whatever completes or perfects an accident is an 
incomplete accident whether it be a part or a mode of the acci-
dent. But if a mode is an accident, and is neither a part nor 
a complement of another accident, it is necessary that it have 
a distinct manner of affecting the substance. This is enough 
to constitute a new genus of accident, because in its own order 
it is a complete accident. Nor can it be placed under any other 
'""enus. 
Ratio item generalis fere tacta est; nam quoad priorem 
partem eadem est ratio proportionalis in accidentibus, 
quae est in substantia; nam sicut id, quod componi t, 
aut integrat substantiam, est incompleta subste.ntia, 
sive sit pars, sive modus eius, it~ quod complet vel 
integrat aliquod accidens, est quid incm:1pletum in eo 
genere accid.entis, sive sit pars, sive modus eius. 
Quoad posteriorem autem partem ratio est, quia si modus 
est accidental is, et non est pars, vel complementlliu 
accidentis in suo esse, necesse est ut babeat propriur.1 
modum afficiendi accidentaliter qui proprium genus acci-
dentis ad quod revocetur, tanquam quid incompleturn in 
eo ordine.lO 
One reading this tD.esis :n9.y perhaps be bewildered at the 
use of the terms "modal accident," and simply "accident," e.z,., 
of quantity. In treatine; the subject a disti:!lction is made 
between the two. One is called mo~al acci~ent and the other 
absolute accident. This distinction has already been mentioned 
im?licitly. An absolute accident is an entity, that is, one 
which has its own independent existence, e.g., quantity, which 
does require a mode of inherence in order to determine a sub-
stance. A modal accident, however, is a mode, i.e., one which 
does not have its own entity, but which does not require a mode 
of inherence, but is of its essence inherine;. If it does not 
inhere it does not exist. 
An absolute accident which has a proper entity really dis-
tinct from substance has by reason of its intrinsic essence 
antitudinal inherence in a substance.llA modal accident, however 
which is only a mode of being, essentially inclkdes not only 
aptitudinal but actual inherence or union with that of which it 
is a mode.l2 
A further distinction made between these two will help to 
clarify the difference tetween them. Modal accidents exercise 
their formal causality in a manner distinct fromabsolute acci-
dents. First it will be proved that modal accidents do exercise 
formal causality. We shall take again the example of the table. 
It has the accident of quantity which exercises its formal effec 
of extension, and this accident is a beine: which could exist by 
itself'. But moreover it has other accidents such as its shape 
" 1 
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and position. These accidents are not the same as the accident 
of quantity. 'They are sometb.ing distinct, for they canilot exist 
separated from the table. The point is, these modes independent 
ly of the other accidents do exercise a. formal causality. They 
are really actuatin[ their subject. Therefore, they exercise 
real formal causality. Suarez puts the matter as follows: 
11:odal accidents which do not :90ssess their own entity, dis-
tinct fro:r;1 the entity of another, exercise ( 1) a formal causal-
ity, and (2) tl:lis in a. manner distinct from that of absolute 
accidents. That they exercise formal causality is shown from 
induction. 'fhus figure is the form of a thing which has shape. 
Yet fiz,ure is not a thin0 but a mode of a thing. Also position 
and local presence formally modify the subject, for they deter-
mine a man as seated, standine;, or present. Yet these also are 
only modes of the ma.n and not distinct entities. Eence these 
modes res.lly modify the subject and form with it an accidental 
composite. 'l'he subject intrinsically depends on the accidents 
as on e. proper constituting act, while t:t,e accidents depend on 
tr.eir subject as on a material cause. Therefore modal accidents 
excrcisP, formal causality in their subjects.l3 
The second part of the assertion, namely that modal acci-
dents exercise a formality different than t:bat of absolute 
accidents may be proved in this way: there is one deficiency 
of entity common to all accidental forms, in that according to 
the order of nature they cs.nnot exist by themselves, but postu-
late a subject of inh~rence. Eut the absolute accidents have 
this deficiency not in their accidental beinp;s, but from the 
impossibility of a ~)urely actua. tin£~ forn e.xistinz without actu-
ating. Such accidents are qualities. 3ut, the modes, on the 
other hand, cannot be separated de potentia absoluta frora their 
subject, simply by reason of their deficiency in even accidental 
bein~. They are mere fashion, so to say, of beinp; yet real. 
In this they differ in the manner of exercisin~~ their formal 
causality, since it is not distinct from the::nselves but is 
intrinsically and essentially included in their being. 
If we return to the example of the table: another proof 
th~ct modal accidents exercise their causality in a different 
way from absolute accidents can be given. It consists in the 
f&.ct that the inherence of the quantity in the table does not 
need another mode of union distinct from itself. Where the unio 
is not distinct from the inherence then neither is the causality, 
and in this they differ from the absolute accident. 
Nam haec accidentia, Cl.llil non sint res disti•1ctae, sed 
modi tantu.TI, non afficiu.nt subjecta mediante aliq"!.J.O 
:modo unionis ab i;)sis distin.cto ex natura rei, 9er quem 
eis uniantur, sed seipsis immediate conjunguntur ••• 
Unde fit in his foi'mis modalibus causam ipsarr1 formalern 
non distingui a sua causalitate actuali, quia causalitas 
forr:1ae, non est aliud ab unione actuali for-.mae ad sub-
jectuzn; ergo ubi non distin,s:uitur unio a forma, nee 
causali tas distingui l)Oteri t. Cui us etiam sie:num est, 
quia huiusmodi formae modales non posst.mt manere in 
rerurn natura, nisi actu causantes suos effectus, etiam 
per potentiam Dei absolutam; non enin :Jotest manere 
sessio nisi constituat sedentem, etc.; quod in universu.~ 
de modis est in superioribus demonstratwn, scilicet con-
servari non posse separates a rebus quas modificant; non 
possunt autem eis esse conjuncti, quin eas afficiant for-
maliter; non possunt ergo actu esse quin actu causent.l4 
It may be noted that in the triple division of t:1.e modes 
into (1) substantial ~odes, (2) modes of absolute accidents, and 
(3) accidental modes, a further difference may be seen between 
a mode and an accident. 'l'he ::r..ode may be found in all the cat-
ezories, hence its transcendental character; whereas the acciden 
is divided off from substance. 
This explanation of the difference between tr.:.ese two types 
of accidents brines t~ a close the description of the nodes in 
ceneral. A few objections placed ar:ainst ther:1 1r.ay be examined. 
At this late part of the work it does not see:"l necessary to 
rid the reader of any prejudices a£ainst the modes. However, 
because they are the 9articular scorn and object of derision of 
modern non-scholastic ph:losophers, for completeness' sake, a 
refutation of this prejudice taken fr01•1 Fr. Ear_?er will be e:iven 
In the interest of Truth, what can it matter whether there 
be a special elass of Accidents that are absolutely in-
capable of being separated from their Subject, or not? 
Do not all these divisions and subdivisions savour rather 
of logical subtlety and of hairsplitting, than of solid 
and profitable knowledge? ••• (To answer this) let us apply 
it to a subject of vital consequence,-- the essential 
constitution of man. Every man is constituted of a soul 
and a body. But how is he constituted of these two ele-
ments? Vlhat is the nature of such constitution? ii'or the 
formation of a man, is it enough that there should be a 
hu.111.an soul and an inanimate body, side by side'? Of course 
not, you will answer; the two must be united. --T·.Iost true; 
and what is that union? Is it something, or nothing?--
You reply, Of course :tt is somethin3; because, wi tl~out 
it, the body and soul would not beco:·1e a man. -- Well, 
then, Is it a Substance or an Accident? -- It cannot be 
a substance, will be the answer; because it cannot stand 
by itself. 3ut it can..'1.ot be an accident either; for then 
r.1an would be a man by accident. Besides, I can conceive 
an Accident to be separable fror,1 its Subject. As a fact, 
in Hathe1'1atics I do so conceive of Quantity. But c. u!'lion 
without any things to unite, is inconceivable. 'i'herefore 
it is neither Substance nor Accident.-- ·what is it, tb.en? 
--I car~ot say.-- Suppose we call it a kode. Surely, 
this is a truth not wholl v UJ."lin: · t. 
all events, it is a truth; and as such cannot be account-
ed a mere 'verbal dispute.•l5 
(1) The usual objection that well-intentioned philosophers 
see against the modes is the fact that the predicament of rela-
tion is sufficient to explain most of the cases where a mode is 
postulated. 
This does not hold, for such a relation could neit~er be 
rational nor real. It could not be a rational relation because 
this is simply a form which is dependent on tbe mind, vvbereas 
the modes are real forms. Neither could the modes be a real 
relation, because such relations im:9ly a respect of one to an-
other. :i.:::.ut the mode of local motion, for example, is more than 
the mere respect of one body to another. Further::.nore, a real 
relation requires an existing tern whereas the modes can be lmd 
without such a term. i''or, if there existed but one body in the 
world, this body would be able to possess the mode of local 
motion without the need of a tenn. The answer to this objection 
is a much disputed idea, naraely whether the ubi of a thing is 
intrinsic or extrinsic to it. If the latter is true, and this 
is vvha t St. Thomas holds, then, there certainly could be no 
local motion if there were only one body in the world. .but if 
the former is true, namely that tl:.e mode is intrinsic, then it 
would be possible to have the mode of local motion wit.h. only one 
body. For further reference to this que.s:tion the reader may con 
sult Urruburu's Ontology, #426, where he presents an answer 
touching on the dispute. 
I -
( 2) Another difficulty seeJls to arise wl:en t~.c i:~wde of in-
herence of quantity or quality in substance is mentioned. It is 
often a.rguec_ t~-ca t since the essence of an accident is to inhere 
in a substance, the addition of the mode of inherence is unnec-
essary. It must be remembered that, as we n1entioned in the dis-
cussion of modal and absolute accidents, actual iiLf}erence is not 
of the essence of an absolute accident but has of its essence 
only aptitudinal inherence. This is why there is need of postu-
lating a mode, -- in order to render the accidents (of quantity 
and quality) as actually iiL~erine. 
(3) It seems that with the modes we have the anomaly of an 
infinite series. 'rhus, e.g., if matter and form are not formall 
deter~nined to union by themselves, but need a distinct union 
which is a mode and if this union, since it is said to be a real 
entity, will in turn need another union in orcler that it r:1ight 
be united to the matter and form, and that in turn will need 
another third union, etc. The result will be an infinite series 
In reply it may be said that this objection would be true 
if it were not of the very essence of the modes to unite.l6 
(4) It is hard to understand why modes, if they are really 
distinct, cannot be separated from their subjects. 
In reply it may be said that, although things which are 
separable are distinct still it does not follow that all thines 
that are distinct are separable. This latter is true of the 
l'10des. And even if a subject is able to exist without a deter-
mined mode, a mode nevertheless is not able to exist without a 
'I 
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subject because it is essentially affixed to and is a modifi-
cation of that subject.l7 It may further be said that the mode 
should not be considered as something alien to its subject which 
effects an intrinsic determination in a thing by actins in it. 
A mode is rather an intrinsic determination which determines a 
subject not through efficient but throuc:h formal causality. 18 
(5) A mode is said to determine creatures which of them-
selves are indetermined. Now certainly the mode would itself 
then have to have so:ne kind of a determination. We have then 
a most imperfect finite thine: being in itself a determined thing 
Therefore it should not seem repugnant that a substance or an 
absolute accident of itself, without any added mode should be 
already deternined. If this were so, then the subjects of modes 
are able to have their determinations of themselves, and there 
is no need of superadding modes. 
Repl~r: this perhaps would be true, if there were not real 
changes in created things, which occur neither throuch substance 
nor the absolute accident. Since, however, there are innumerabl 
~odal changes continually occurring in thinss, it see~s clear 
that these things are of themselves not able to be determined.:B 
(6) It is not only unnecessary but even repugnant that the 
determination which an existinc- essence needs, in order that it 
mico;ht be, or that it be such a thing ·with this or tb.a t affection 
should come to the essence throuzh something distinct from itsel • 
In reply it must be remembered that modes are not necessary 
to the existence of a thing. Rather they are determinations and 
r 
affections of preexisting things. 
In answer to the second part of this objection, namely that 
it is repugnant that an existing essence should be individuated 
by means of s01:..ethin~ distinct from itself, it may be said that 
tj::.is does not hold, if of its very nature the essence is indif-
ferent.20 
As with any subject, so with the modes, a study of the ob-
jections placed. a~ainst it will make the subject clearer. If 
t~1.e reader wishes further material on this, he may find it in 
the sections of Urraburu, Pesch, and Lossada cited in the foot-
notes.21 
The objections must be left, however, to take up in the 
next chapter a study of some practical applications of the modes. 
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CHAPTEH IV 
PR~CTICAL J.:..PPLICATIONS OF 'rHE l'!~ODES 
This chapter will study the various places in the Meta-ohysic~ 
v1here Suarez makes application of his modes. Its purpose is 
rather expository than definitive. Nor does the chapter propose 
to :_;ive a complete exposition of the doctrine involved, but 
rather to show hovv in these particular instances Suarez uses the 
modes. 
The first application of the Suarezianmodes will be the 
modal union of :;natter c.nd form. This can best be understood by 
answerine:, a diff:tculty against it. In the composite, how many 
unions are there? Suarez says that in his opinion it is very pro~ 
"bable that there is only one mode, and that is the mode of the 
form. 
The basis for this opinion is the function of the form with 
respect to matter. Matter is changed only when the form attaches 
itself to or recedes from the matter. If the form, then, is re-
sponsible for the chanGe, it also must be throu.:.;h the form that 
the union of form with matter is brousht about. This being so, 
there need be only one mode of union, thr.:_t of the form. The o-
pinion can be made clearer by two exrunples. If a once handso:rJ.e 
column -vvhich is resting on a solid base is completely destoryed, 
';,'e do not say that the base is thereby destoryed. So, too, if a 
piece of wood becomes warm there are not two changes in the wood, 
one in the heat's entering the wood, the other in the union of 
It e Y'iOoct to the he::o.t. 'i'here i c• 
- '-~ only one ch.sn.:._je, c.:w'l th.'i. s eon-
.; si10ii:i.n~ the ~;:cobability that the me.t!>::;r L~l.S no distinct mode 
c<f' union. A ·r·1ocJe of l..J.nion is one wl1ic~1 1.1n~:.te::! t-c''O extrerr1e:3, as 
-~· -::, bod:· u1.d tlJ.e sou.l :Lnto one )erson. Por t~-:js l.J.nion, one sim-
or union, th~~ of the for~ suffices. 
Since, Lhen, there 
Suarez nroves this latter ooint by showin~ the fune-
'..l'l.te vYhole efL'icacy of the cause is ezercisel on 
i.n eL!nc l n~ :'L t fro)a thE:- rr2 t c.e:r·, or in unit in:.:; 
the fore: to be fro:r:'! 
. ..,_i_ i~: ,.:_; ·r_/. 0 ··-~ (~ (1 .L.-·, ,..-,:;; ·: __ l't.) ,-:~ t G.('· 't~ j_ f'.l__ ·,_;_r ..> .. T ('1 11 J • 1 • 1 1 t.. 1 • ·-~ - - ·--- - -- - ln 1~e ~~nner, (Oes no~ Ol-
:t is rather of the essence of matter to remain invariable. It 
changes only by reason of the form which it receives or is de-
:Jri ved of. Therefore Suarez concludes that since there is need 
of only one mode of union, which is that belon0ing to the form, 
matter has no distinct mode of union \Vi th the substantial form • 
• 
•••• esse valde probabilem partem negantem (that is, the 
part which says there is only one mode of union) f1Uia ad 
unionem duorum extremorum, quae inter se inur·ediate uni-
untur, sufficit unus simplex modus unionis, et assignari 
potest specialis ratio, ob quam talis modus mat;is ad form-
am pertineat, et cum illa realiter idem sit, ltuam cum 
materia; er6 o non oportet plures modos huiusmodi multi-
ylicare. JYiajor probatur, quia omnis modus unionis est 
vinculum duorum extremorum, unde ad utrumque dicit habi-
tudinem, sine qua esse non _;JOtes t; ergo quill bet modus 
unionis unit duo extrema, quorum est unio; ergo unus suf-
fici t ad huiusmodi extrema conjungenda.... l\linor autem, 
scilicet, hunc modum potius pertinere e.d formam quam ad 
materia.m, prohe."tur, quia tota efficientia agentis natur-
alis terminatur formaliter et proxime ad formam, educen-
do illam, vel uniendo materiae; ergo quidquid de novo 
facit, est in forn1a tanqua.m in formali termino actionis 1 
in materia autem solum ut in subjecto, et ideo non unit 
materiam formae directe efficiendo in materia specialem 
modum sed solum uniendo formam ipsi materiae, et effi-
ciendo in ea. informationem et unionem, vel inhaerentiam. 
Estque hoc consentaneum modo se habendi et concurrendi 
maeriae et formae; nam materia substat actioni aeentis, 
et adventui ac recessui for:P1arum. Unde, quantum ad suam 
entitatem, omnemc;_ue suum intrinsecum modum, invariata 
manet, solumc;ue variatur vel mutatur ratione privation-
1)>1 aut formae recedentis, aut cienuo advenientis.2 
Another famous mode of Suarez' is the substantial mode of 
~ubsistence. We can treat the subsistential mode only in sum-
~ary form. 
Personality, says Suarez, does not consist in some positive 
!entity, rather it is a substantial mode which completes and ter-
~inates a nature and renders it incommunicable. Personality, or 
~ational subsistence, then, may be defined as the ultimate 
-, I 
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terrduation of nature in the ord~r ~r existence, an.d not of ~s-
It will furth0r clarifv this theory 
u 
to 
·;llL~t Suarez ''1eans here by existence. To exist for e. 
:;..stPJlCe ~-s not cieter-r,lineO., it :is inco~'lplete s.nd is not e.ble to 
·_:.ve tl~e ns.tur·e a.::· subsistence. 
)lete nc,ture o.l' existence &nd complete tl:Je nature of t'::' erected. 
:~-J.bs tt"L:-J.ce, in orlier to ::_;1 ve it the proper char c.. c.: ter· of _:_;er ;"";anal-
i t:I. so.id to "be :!.n the order 0f exLstence snd 
not or essence~ 3y essence here is me&nt the raaical 0perative 
e usually express V'ihen we c;i ve the clefini tion 
u.i:' s t}·Ji.n.::__. Lccorrl:in,£ to its esse essentiae a netll''E' 'fJOY be cm'1-
]lete and h~ve no nseJ of ~ ~ode to determine it in this order. 
eon~titu-
tion of t~0 note of :9ersnnality: first, a natur-e hcs its essence, 
The lac:. t YJ:::Llsd :i.s 
the function 9roper Lo oersonL•.li t'T. 
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•••• personalitas non sit pro.)rie terminus aut modus na-
turae secundum esse essentie.e, sed secundum esse exis-
·tentiae ipsius naturae •••• existere ex se solum dicit ha-
bere enti totem extra causas seu in reru;:: nr,tura •••• sub-
sistere dicit determinaturn modum existe:ndi per se et 
sine dependentia a sustentante; •••• I;;itur quamdiu ex-
istentia non est terminata per modum existendi in se et 
.f)er se, adhuc est incomplet& et in statu quasi potenti-
ali, et ideo ut sic non potest habere rt:<tionem subsisten-
tiae •••• Tunc igitur existentia naturae substantialia 
eri t complete terminata, quando fueri t affecta modo ex-· 
istendi pe:::r se; hie ergo :::nodus coml:Jlet rationem subsis-
tentiae creatae; ille ergo habetpropriam rationem per-
sonalitatis, seu ·suppositalitatis. Ideo:Jue merito dici-
tur esse terrdnus, aut modus naturae secundum esse exis-
.tentiae, quia secLlndum esse essentiae, jam natura est 
omnino completa, neque indiget e.lia determinatione, prae-
sertim cum jrun supponatur contracta usque ad individua-
tionem et singularitatem; sic igitur concepta secundum 
esse essentiae proxime ac immedie,te indic;et existentia, 
qua fiat ens actu; postquam vero est essentia in actu, 
solum indicet modo existendi in se ac per se; hie erzo 
ultimus est terminus naturae secundum existenti~~ eius, 
et hoc est proprium munus suppositalitatis.3 
A further example of the Suarezian mode is the much discuss-
ed one of creative dependence. 
Creation is limited and dependent. This dependence of crea-
tion is a special substantial mode. It is called substantial be-
cause it is notllin.::; other than the substance in the state of be-
corninc;. That this notion is :;?Ossible Suarez proves from a para-
llel with motion. lv.lotion is not placed amont, the predicrunents 
because it is reduced to the predicruaent of its term. This is 
so because rr.otion is only a thine; on the way to its termina-
tion. A tirln3 in this state is not related to its term as to a 
form but as an imperfect thin6 to a perfect thing. So creation, 
since it is on its wa;;- to a substantial term, is reduced to the 
1::redicru2ent of substance. It is not reduced to the predicament 
I I 
from which it comes; it is not a s""J.bject. To the proof' of this 
latter statement Suarez next turns his attention. 
Vlhen we think o.r the becominc; of nature, we naturally con-
ceive it as prior by nature to its actual existence. Eut it must 
t~e cautioned that to do this we must conceive this becominc.;; not 
as in a subject, but as it were, in itself. This is not impos-
sible. In fact, in this concept there is contained what is meant 
b~r the mode of creative dependence. For at the same moment in 
which creation becomes, it actually exists. This it does not as 
in a subject but a.ccording to a special relation by which becom-
ing is .related to a.ctual existence. Therefore, in reality the 
priority of nature of becomin;:s to its term is not required, since 
becomint docs not require true causality but only termination. A 
comparison may be ruade with heat in vm ter. 
Heatinc; is both in water which is made hot and in the heat 
whicl-1. does it. In water the heating exists as in a subject of 
inhaesion, &nd presupposes the water. But th6 heat exists in 
the becoming hot as in a formal tern;. to whicb it tends. There-
fore the becoming hot does not presuppose the heat, but brings 
' it a .. on:::, with itself, and really, is identified with it. So crea 
tion does not presuppose a subject but its becomin0 is identified 
with it. 
Thus, the dependence of creation~ since the relation to a 
subject is te.ken avvs.y, cannot be reduced to the predicmnent of 
;:assio. There is left only the relation to its term which is ac-
tual existence, and this is a substance. In this relation we 
find the dependence not as in a subject, but in a special -vvay, 
as a mode of it.4 
Suarez ;:_;ives credence also to ttose who say that creation 
may be reduced to the predicament of action. At least he says 
that this is a probable opinion, but the first theory seens to 
be the truer. ~uae responsio est 'Jrobabilis, sed prior veri or 
videtur.5 
Another int0restin0 use of thE:. mode is the predie;w.Twnt, ubi. 
Suarez radicall;y differs from many other philosophers in I1.is ex-
planation of this .. _.;redicament. He devotes an entire Disputs_tion 
to it, soint; throu;jl. thirty-three folio pages to urge his point. 
Suarez has a style of his own. He states the O.fiposite opinions, 
refutes t:ach one in turn, then proposes his own theory. 
There is presented here only the essential J?Ositive part of 
Suarez' theory on the mode of ubi. 'ro obtain these bare essential~ 
it will be nccessar,y to pick them out from various )arts of the 
f.:Jis;mtation. The subj c:ct 'Nill be treated_ in tr~e followin.: manner 
first, it will be provecl that t:'le ~node is intrinsic to its sub-
ject; secondly, that it is distinct from its subject; thirdly, 
that the :~ormal effect of thG mode uakes its subject to be :here 
or there. 
It '.vill be proper, first, to ,sive a dsfinition of ubi. Ubi 
is a real intrinsic mode of a t"~,in::, b~r whicn it is placer'1 some-
~h6re and throu:_h vv-hich it is said to be here or there. This 
aode results, not .from its surroundln_s surfaces but from a cause 
vhich constitutes a thins to be in place. Suarez proves that thi~ 
c.l' 
;wt just t:>. f'~_ct) on D1~ t!•s :::ri_n,1_ for· tld.s v!f.:c::· true even before::: the 
I)ico Sl"~<) ~JY·~_:1o, t~e,~,;:: :l.rl 1 :l,LV)li~)et c.;Jr~~)()J.·~ yro~Jr:~_,u_~-~! (lU.errr--
dc,.,:. l''OUU!l :Lntr·jnsec·,Fn, e~~ ~;cttl.ret rei d:i8t:inctllirl a sub-
8 t !? .. _J t -;_ 0., r fi 1 ~.:.:··l t 1 t ~-- te, 6 t all 1. s ace ·i. (lt-:n_t :i_tq~l-("~~ c orr)()]~~- :J, a 
(1·-lO J'' ,j,J G3.senc3.j _ _,_~ur:t,!t:-'ll tcr l;abet un,J.r·111UOd';Ue cor:c>'l.S 
es~::t, l)r·ees611~~ loc.~).1i·t.r;rl r:> .. lie 1J.;Jj_, -9F.:u 1l)i, ll1):.i esse dlci·-
tl_,¥r. Pro1)Ll.t1_lr·, (11..119. GU)tl e(;r~;n.ls c1ici t··~:._- f3sse 1J:tc ·vel 
il1 i c, 11 is 'Jr:J ci 1J\:t:3 s i,~JJ:l_ .fi c tl t~u.r ::~1 i r-lt) ~ _-i l'e(_-:)_1 e cr)11.ve11i ens 
tD.li C0r~JOr·i, tlJ~'_l rllli8.. Cl. ~)C.r~te l·ei i1~ f;~ t~ \!el'l.JYf} r;·j ·n.e 
Suar-
-:J.ll? 'rlenti::. fictione, tur' E'~t:i'c',lll 'lU_:L~~ illu·J JOtest ac-
lUiri et a:mitt:J.. ~>er l!'.'.).t~J.tiortem :ret:,le~YJ; 1•Dtus enim localis, 
:eee_l.Ls m1X~[ctio est, et; tamen .:.1er illu:m non al'littlt,J.r, nee 
acq,liP:Ltur, nisi esse ~--:ie vel illlc; turn eti<cY! cpda hoc 
:L~sum esse hie vel ~llic, est conditio necess~ria ad ac-
t:i.ones ret:tl6s, V8l .:_![:_,'3sJ.onss, et censet,J.r e'3se fundame:J.-
tc.m. rE:l[:t~_unu::1 realiun.6 
t.·l .. :"·n of' +-.",·.·J.".-.. ·-·-·l·'t· ·-)-C> t' · .. ,,--'r. ll.i"l. -~-'-) ...l- I.L l"t;c.,_ ..L ;;t ~... l .!.tv it_,_vl.,l.c, ~· .?irst ;_le g:i ves an exposl-
::;1o:c1 o1' ~1is .~loctr.!<E::. '.·JitJ-;out 2d·lJn.:_ here a oroof for hls conten-
Llon. 
1~ rnQ one )lace to ~nother is a re~l c~ance. For if a body were 
:._-;lace to 2not~~er, its c~lan(::e would be s :t:~nilar to the: way extr lns i 
' . .sno;;tinatlons chan ,.e ln 'lod when =:e is sai.--.J to be in vE:.rj ous 
creatures. ~~en ~ hody varys this way it changes intrinsically. 
It is Suarez' c0ntenti~n, then, that in local motion there is an 
int-r•lr!S~.r; chan~e. Tl'ds t"leens to c•JntrarJ..!.ct 1\:eistotle and also 
St. Tho~as when he says, 
1l'Obile soc:JJ1dw:1 loc·:.J .. :!T!. non est in _DOtentir-t D .. d c.li·~uid intrin-
Sc':,CW', in quantum 1l.uiu.srcloc3.i, sed soltllll ar) s.li·.1uir~~ eztrinse-
cun., '3cilicet ad locurn. 
·~rra<xuru answers the •Jif{'iculty b:r distin.:::;uisnin,:;. It .~s true 
~~~t local ,~otlon is not a chan3e in an absolute accident, but 
.~ t :is s.n intr·5.nsic c'·J.c.n:::;e in a nodal aceiJent. 
j_' ~ not "'(J.Y.1<=>+-hin·' 
- 0 .•.•. ..., v... '-..:.. 
rxtrinsic. --. • • t. .:. ~l S E~ l!:":l l S .., 0 2how that tho ·u.bi oi' a body does not 
Je11el:1<.l on t:J.r:o· su~1orficies which s1Jrround it. ::is doctr:ino may 
)e nado clear·er b:r several exa,·nples. 
If a ~E.rson nor·e to s;;~ri:rJ. in a river· upstree.m, tl1e .S' .. lr·face 
:1icl~, StlY'rCY'l.Y!ds !1Ln would. be constantly· chan,sini:_';. ~.~Je may also 
s Lt~)~··) o ::~ e tb.s.t e,t the rr·.te he .S svrir:1r:"1i113 he is not 2ble to _pro-
ro~-'< 
.,_) '-''J0 U_;_)S tl")88.r.l; 1-. ~'::l J L'-" is exertine; just enou.:::;h enersy a.:;ainst the 
current to st&J in the same _place. Everyone ~ouJ.d a!hit that 
~lt~ou~h t~e su0erficlss are constantly ehanginc, the swimmer 
, . 
f'1lS Or, o.gain, vve rna~r t~?..ke the exarn~)le of 
.Z'rOl1 :-11~3 1rrorl: clot11es to his for--c,c..J. attir-e. The superfic.i.es of 
the 1."iOv.ld-be-·Siner '"'1a ve cl'JEcn:;ed, 1:lu. t he 11-::tE' not ehan:_::ed his l..' .. b5 ... 
''Ould reolv to ~ " thc::t the -,.-1bi r1us t oe deternined 1J~r 
..,-
sr:lrr~''cer, tlJ.e ba-:1~::s oL' the river, L1 t~1.st of the <'iiner, tl::.e I'OOm 
i;'"' which he dresses. To make this 1i stl.nction, i10wever, t}:ey 
~re obliced to ~bs.ndon their theorv v.rl'.icr1 sE·~y.s that the u"'oi is 
~ --
~)•)taine<:J. fror:1 the cont2ct of the immec1ia tely snrroundinc bodies. 
Just as all the superficies ·~•hich surroun6. E'. m9.n may chan=:e 
end yet f:l_llow :-lira to keep h:i.s or·e.:;in~.l ubi, so, also, ···1t:.c:T he keery 
Qnci -.;ret chan··"e his u"bi. 
u --
Thn.s, if a cnan 
~ere in a room on the first floor of a buildin['; he would have a 
the superficies. If this ro or•J. were to move to the i'ii't'--1 floor, 
f:l cies, hu.t no one woul\5 doubt that his ubi hacl chanQ:ed. 1m-
other e~(:J.r':J1le WOlJ.ld be ths t of c man dri vin:.:; in an autowo1)ile. 
~obile the entjre tri~, yet no one ~ould deny that he has chan:-
Ther•efore, concludes S"\.1.3rez, the u'bi of a f)ody cannot come 
sonet:-,J .. n:_: whic'-: J_s Jntr·Insic to t:v, body. In confirrr.otion 
Suarez states th&t if. the extrinsic surroundin~s of a body and 
its u'.)i '•rer·e 1-icnt:L:l it woulc1 not 1Je yossi ~)le to keel) one e.nd 
lose L'te ot'hpr. :Su.t sJnc.e in reElllty it :ts r:ossible to lose one 
:.Jlcl. not t':e otl,er, u·oi '11US t 1)6 <1or·e t~an the extrins .tc surronnd-
l. " C) then, says SuPrez, 
to 1wli3 tb.nt the 1·tode of ubi exists in tbe bod~r itself, .s.ncl 
tn.'.t 
~.J'fer;t.'3 U:e 1:•urJ.y tln'ou)l ~- truP. union or identl ty v!i t1~ it. 
1iursus l'1oc. :t::>svm reale, 'luor1 ld2 vocihus sube::"t, esc-:e 
1··J_r;, V3l ilL1. c, n.on est Etlir1ui•l mere extrinsecun1 illi 
cor;:wri, '.LUOc"i !de vel i bi esse ,jj_ci tur, neCLue in sola 
c.).f;nO'ninati•Jne eztr:i.nseca consi stere f'otc' ,st. .t,uod 2)6 tet, 
)rh,lo, quic•. per· rrutatlone;a solius cJeno,•line.tionis ex-
tr:insE::c~-,e non r:1utatur res ree.liter; nm: etl£-c>ol in Dec 
variatur ~enominatio extrinseca, qua dicltur es8e in 
hs.c ·vel illa cre~J.turs., et tamen non propterso Deus 
r:mto. tur; sed nor~)US si nunc sit hie, et ~!Of: tea alibi, 
int:rinseee et res.liter n1utc~tur; er~:;o non vs.rjatur in 
illo sola denominatio extr5n8~ca, sed altquid intrin-
sece in ipso existens; illud er:o sizniricari dicinus 
illis voclbns, e.s~e ~1ic vel illtc. Secundo, quia si 
esset <:tliqui·~ ext.r~.nsecun, r 1axime esset cornDs c·jrcu-'1-
dans, seu su'0r·ficies eius ultin&; sed hoc non; erzo. 
Prol)e. tur me nor·, qu ie., l icet v2.1:·ie tur C()rpus c ircu_r,Jda:LlS, 
nlhilo,·;im..!.s cor)1J.s i~Jide'il •;Janet 1.:. 1 >-~ £mtea era. t, nee yer 
:i llan vari?.tionei,J cor.:_JorUYil, c.ut SIJ.)er·f'~_cler'UF! cire,J.m-
cl~nt :i.u:-:1, 'YJU ta tur I'e8.li b:;r corolts eire m•1d2 tum, •••• Er ::;o 
converso r·es, c1u.ae erat hie, t::'..libl con~-3tituitur, etiam-
si sc. ·;81 1 s1.:t~'erficie eiu3lf"·rn cor;oris circumst::cJnt:L:' C'lr-
Clir~1r--leri~)8_ttlr·. FI"l;::o il1 1J.d_ in '.flJ.() :.Lntr·in_8ece cclllsisti t 
e~<se hie vel 8.li~Ji, no:-1 est sola ill>c. 'lenmrLinati0 e:x-
tr111S ece }!l·ove~·~tie:1.s L~ e()t}:~JOl·r::: r._ l_l~C,J_Y,,s er~i ~)er1te. ~~?,Y1 s i 
''tvtc:tu:r· circunsr;r.L_0t:Lo, et :1anet· idc11 es.se bie, crzo 
.:11 i ~lui cl ali ttcl est ho r~ , , · ::: s e l.J.i e, ·-i u.Gi"'~1 6.!: txj ins E. c ~- c ir cu.rn.-
sc~·l'i~)t:i.o; n.~~T1 9J .. ess .·.-. :.·]Gr~~, non ~Josset 1J.:t11Jr!1 SJnj_tti, 
et ~tliud rstineri •• , •• ::.ccJ:Lnqui t>J.r er:_:o hunc modum 1?-SEJe, 
~~ntrit1:1e0,111 corpor·i !:<licu.l'ji exi tontJ, id est, ln 
l:oso A~d.?tente:c;·, E:t afi'·icienter1 ilh.Fl ]er· \!f'TC.'n u.nion-
•sn vel i.c~entitatH·' ClJ.n illo. 7 
c.cci0E:nts in the subject. 
i'llen a, ''1~:.n ·noves fro.n one room to another he 11::::.:::- a different u'Jl. 
~~t he can Rtill keep all t~e othGr ac~idents whic~ he heH such 
'.-·JlC 
L:: :l:to 0 -=~c. :t l c __ -)1' o ~J c·. tu1· lDJ 11c~ -,-1 o.]l.J..T,l e s ~=: e (l:i. s t i11e t1JT1 t;, ]: 
YlG.tu_r'~ 1·~-~; __ ,_ E~ S"~J.:J~ecto, c~u~-<lt:~.t!:_tc Ht c.:::~.ete-1·~~8 c .. ccj_-
!Jent~ ~._)tJ_~~ (ji~:!\.J, (~11_,_:1.~:.:- ~~-lc r~J~.Jcl_•J..'-~ ~---~rJt:e:st c.e.-l·~_~..lr~~:_ E.;t ~Jer·d.i, 
11! l1l ,c_'_ -~.'.1.~ :·)_ Ll f~ ~- ·s -~- r)11E3 l...., ~ 8 0 P .. i }""}_ E:. l J j·) j t=~ C t:)' ?.1(::: l ~).8 ~ JJ. q_·:_1.S.11-
t~.tc::,_te, t: \}t CC~(---;tc:r-=:!_:..i -~~1J.:.~vl·j_ t:::.t_~_~)\l_C2 Cil..lS • --rr··.-~ _:;(~~t' ··-~1_]_-
t~ .. L:~_!,Jrl::·.. lrJe~·le1; :-.c fLlT~It1J.:~c ]_._ie r·,_o(l·),f:), ct ~--:~:itt:l.t:J_l' 
:. .. 1.1 1.1 . .:·. ·::· J. --~- ::>~1 (-:;-- :-~) r :_;_:}_ :t·:_ i ::~ , J1(JrJ. _r· ~·- c t c· n·u. t <. t~ -~ v ,t f_.:·: }_ rt · 1 ~" 
~ -·- J... [. J· z::. , .J C-r· 'J C 1 .. · :~ :_i.C;.n.J 0 ; (jl' ..___, t.J f:; :\. tj C\r~e::-:·r '; :~_:, .·L..._ 
1
l'"'.tC' Y"f:'! C 7_; t:; 
C':.-_~l1.CJ. ~~::_ ttd" u_~··' ;~,.-·~:·tic; E.:•;_ 11C.t ll"·5;.. T·~::.i_, St:.·_l·l_J~:-;_':': J:·~od.el~~-
i ! ·-:o~).c~ ~t--.>.11t~ t·:t-~ 1=. ~r11.r·· ·. __ -;111~~;~3 c· ~ ~~ ... rTJP:_;l r·A.:· .. l p,·~·--, i~J. 
2.l:t ~:j_,::· ~-.~~ :-:::r-._:·~ J -frO:l.:1 -~H?-1' US.~-t :v.--~-~l·;:~L~--·t 
~:~.-~~t r-~:1J.L~·~ti:) ~).)[2~l t·~ ·v~!., '-Ir::l 2~' ~-I:! C2-~~., 
1 Lt~·.t,:.-_) ::-.;1·!--.(-JJ 10(;~'.1.5.~, ,-l,.J~~i:. ~-:il ~~Ul' .... )!~l1":l:_n);3 S8.="'(l_l)~'l' eSt 
,.~.:::. r~.r~ ~J t er·J_--,._1_r1o lJ o b =!_ t. i '-lO i ·;1 ~~- ]_ i c··_~:r, 1~1 :.~l • _t: 1-·~ lJ_t-~ n.~~~ c 'J s .:-:. F1 r· to 
Jr;·:~lt1(:.·it; J..j C·'_lJte··--1, -'i'U..OC1 r-J.:; IJ.r)V'J t:•t I"·GH.ll~~~(::~~· ~-c·~f~Ji:f·it·j-~r­
rn()~-~-j_l_ J, n011 ~Jotest. T10rl, f.:'Sr->~:~ .~:~c:-:.1~-~f-?-·' ·.·Jn<J':.l.j ~0-:;Y· ~:.~;::t t..r;_cttT·""·~ 
J;J li.··~~ r-fiJ.C_f' C:llt~-=;u__ 1-tL::t~J!::~~J~t • 8 
,,, .J ... 
t)O.:; Cl. 
L. ,, 
'·-'' 1• e D. t ,_...:.r e r; 
It 
t o t c._l:: e. . : .......... lJ:1'J .. -:_1. 1 er·r-..1.1 ce 
·<;:J.o cl ver· c i.""" \)r·; ·:D~J- :1 s e f.:C e c tlJ s fru_I 11 s pr r. e t3 E; -~1 t i cte s e1J. n-trJcl i 
sit 00n::-:tjt,Jr:;r·e ~'-t'P" su~J,ject·.,_-'n }:i::c v~:-;1 .l.lJ:ie, facj_le 
t:ti::~:r-l ~~r·cJ-~)b_turJ e_Y~ (~lct:i .. ~:, 'l-tl:ls_ ·. 1t.l~J.rr~~.1il1_ l"'r~';:~ l~UY1f:er"\tat 
:~,_-: (-18 1-,-,,_nc ·x,o,)~Y-1 nro.e'3ent:L:r.:o, se·'-)•::n• ibic1e·•· -~~·-net, ubi 
-yl·-i··'" "-'<'-·->t ct·l·~-·-,;--;,.j__• ''F·l <:l·if-1"- 'r''-111 t~nt·ur· <-·ii'C'" i,-Jc.-•-;·1°1 lJ+-
....... - - LA..\ .J \..£ .J... '-'· ' \../ ~<.. l l.) \! ._/ d -·~ -\.A . .___, • _ \..."_ _, J. . ...1 -'- -\. • ..:;; .. J ~ •- t' ~ \J 
c'Jeclsratl.l.l'lJ_n est :in ex.s'''lplo arboris ez:istenti ::' in. ::lu-
r '-~~ 11<3' v·el ~~ .. ~-1SlX!Yt.(:18t :tJ1 Ul~i_iS 9.liiS C:~.cei(.8rlt.:_·;:;u~:; ~·-:ru.tr-~'t 1J.I~, 
1~~ t ~-n celort:;, :; 1 :~ c.olo:el--), P t s in;i 1 i ·bus. E t s conv;:,y- :c; o, 
:• ~uto.to hoc :!'Odo J:ll-~c,esentiae, :J.esinlt res i"oi '3Sse ubi 
t::~r·tE,::_ er:;·t, .etL:rc::si lT'.J.llt:::_ alia nutatio i:i_g_t, nee in in-
:l[:,~erc~J1 t _i ~JIJ.3, ltF, c ~-n a(lj c:t.c e~l. ti-:JllS re 1.1:J_,s, lJ. t e t i a-~-1 cle cltl-
rst-~, est 0xs ~lo ho~!nis qui in navi defertur; er~o si~­
n.tL' . .l Of:Jt )rO'!l'iu:j et;·ectwn forr'D_l·e.,, tc.li2 :'"locH ·or:::..;;sen-
t~~[_e, e,c:.~s.~: Elict.l-Ji co:-1stitL1er·~ re~;~! c·ui·u.s f;E;t od.l-~~3, ;Se-
r:.-,L'Lclo, _._-L~i:.:t IjGr '(no tum loc;,:;_le_ru lJOl" SG .~~riv;1o ':J!<ltl_iri tur vel 
c:::ittit:.n· l·dr; 1cOLI.us )l'Er.c~sent:te.e, •J,t decl[U·E.turl est, et 
ar'I~)liu.::: cQn.stabi t ex dic3ndis. Sei.'i. 'l'Jod )er rutation-
crr: locE.lA''' )r:i_mo L~C·-rniritur, vel ::u'rittib;r, e.:::t f-E'SC hie 
vel illic •••• erc;o hie >nodus est quo for·.-nali te1· c.ox!s t1 t,ui-
tur :res c.licubi. 9 
Closel-;y relc.tecl to ubi is the__, Y)rt::d::_c&::lE.Jlt :slt1.1.s 
l t t s its very aff:i ni t:y to ubi 'N~"l:1.c'J ,~,akes 1. t ~I& rei l:;r_) ex:;lrdn. 
Situs in ordinary lan~~~~e is. taken to mean t~s posture or way in 
It 8&] he de£lned &s the positio~ or order of )2rts of 
· 11wle 1:n 
~;_:_c,tinct, for i:)oti:: :rPodes are lost or 9.c:quirec1 ;.:ji th locbl ,1ot1_on. 
j 
n-~::_ vie con"lic:i.er- :~ t c.s placin:_:: e. t}J:iYt:__:; here or· t~Jere tb a eer·-
to.in dist8.nce or n:e-:.Tness to anoth:::r· }ls.ce; 'rrl;en vre s:Jea:~ of situ 
usu8lly o~sorve this r-ational distlnctic1n in our ordinary SJeech. 
ried to s.nothe:c ·0lace as cht:.n;::~in[~ his place, b1.1t not his ]OS:i tion 
5o, o.lso, we say a i:Jan c:l:_;_Hn::es h1s position LL' he crosses or un-
crosses his ,:nees, ";:>u_t •He do not ~38.31 trJat si:m_ply by doins t>is he 
lc.as chancecl '1is plD.ce .10 
EJultin:_:; frcJrc &n ubict~tion of its ·:)Elrts. I'his dis~>osition, c.l-
• J_ lt_, is I • l"t ,. J. • t: '> ' 0 no·c 1_n ree. l y c.u_s ;_;lnc" rro:m ~' yet rr:a:r be con-
ceive<J in thE fas!Jion oi: D. certD.in !dnd of d:i st.lnct form. It has 
nevertheless, :"lode of denomin9. tio·r.t anc1 0redicc.tlon. 
This is 0.:10t.l' h to '''2J'e a nrecliC8."1ental c:U.st:inction 'oetvreen t~~e 
two. 
I::;itur cdcend;_u~l cecl.seo, J:'orrn.an sit,Js, 'lLJ.[;_e c-b.t (-=:.eno>:1-
:!.nr•.tionem J:n1ius r:;r~Jcc11csr'18Dt:i., e;3se i:~s•Fmnet ubi su'0 
divr:'rsa rt._-,_l;:1_r:,rw cone 'tu:r:, 1tc~ 1J.t, sicut c.d distin:}J.-
en.J£•,',1 :::l.ctL;ncn et ,,2.2-~"'ionsr:1 suf'ficit c3i:1tinr:tio ration-
i.e', it :·de snf.::'icie t inte:r si t'J.111 ct ubi. Consisti t 
f;uteH Ji:::~tinctlo l't-.tionis ~-n 1'WC., r:l1 lO'l U~Di 1J.t sic 'SOlum 
~licit ilJur '>toch:u-'1 r}lJ..<:ttenus c~0nsti tui t rem ~~raesente:n 
c.llc-t.l~)i.... .t.t voro si hue' 'Jt slc dicit illur1 -rnodurn ut 
•J.enorlin:-cte-'J re:u its disposlt<:r,·c in ;::;e, dis~)Ositione lua-
dt'J",J. rc2._J.lt:_::.1te :::~~- loc~,lJ coorc,:i.n;;: .. tlone ·>E:.rti1..un. :n 
~ua deno~inati0n2 nan uttsnditur- ratio prEesentiae, 
nee or.Jo c.3 ~)2.tiu:n ~)rO)riE., ~;c:r3_ ordo )artium inter EJ.e; 
Ohjo ( inr-lus.:::-1) no~1 _prou t dicit re 1f'. t. ione•·n _;;waed i camentalem, 
sed ;~rout est funclGro!enhm eius •••• Est erc;o situs quuedam 
cl~_sr)ositio 8-·tttnlis 5JCll lz~cr:llP c~O!tSlli'r_~ens ln toto e:·: 
tali nartiurn ubicat:i.one; quae disposi tio, '1UBmv i.s in re 
n~:n sit r;.lj:quicl disthlCtutn eb illo Modo qu.i est ubi, a 
nobis t~nen conci~itur ~er ~oJ~rr, cuiusds~ formae dlstinc-
tae, ';;.U:.lc di ver:3tJ.rn modw'J c.lenonin~J. tioni s et praedj c8.tionis 
b.1bet, quocl s&t::ts est ad distinctlonsrr1 praedicamentalem.ll 
of the ~oJes are brou~ht to ~ close. Fis use of t~e0 is not con-
fined to the ones ,resented in t~is work. Rather his a~~lication 
of' t~~w·, is S!)reac:J. tl1rouc::;bout 1Jis 'Tietap:Cqsics. They fOF1, as it 
an understundln~ or Sucrezlan neta~hysics. 
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I11 C0~1cl-tl.s ion .'j_ iJ'.Jor·cl b0 said &bout the nlace of Suarez 
In :Lis ovm da~1~ he enjoyed a re:>:nar-
t;:.l)le )O)ll_lcrl ty. 'I''J.:l s L3 th,_:o J"'.OT'A .SL:tr_rn·isL1c; since today outside 
' . ~J.e :~_ s -~~ 11 o vn-.1 • I11 t~··2.e ~Jl:t:r•[t.s c. of his con-
b _, +- ' r---·---~ uO :Je the iJoolo: Enr·ope was 'J~litin~: :tor. ITI & short time this 
:crot only Jn hiE 
~c:; ti lie S11al11 'Nt s Suarez po~ml>:cr lJ-ut 8.1 so in Prates tant Gern=my. 
The Protestant ~biloson~er 7eerebo~rd calls bin the ~ope an~ 
Decartes, Lei1J-
:ere 
[C s~Ju.r·ez. 0 
L~fter enjoyin_~ t'·i~: ::)Criocl or reeo:_:;:;_l.i ticm s-,J.urez see:Js to 
In bur own day, ~!ow-
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Indeed in t~is ll~e (meta~bysics) ~e ]roves to have t~e 
~.'lOSt r:;<)~-·1_(~rc~}-:iJ31'13i\TC end. 0l1~)tle: ~~i:1.d Of-. any rr.~.E~n since ~3t. 
~rJ1.(JTi~!t-:.s, ~:-ncJ, }}_ls ._
1
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";:';i.e ~;!:.LJ.d•Jnt 1 .ill0 C:'OmecJ.ay nill t&:ce Cu)•IH Su~_r·sz I :•:eta)h;rsiCS 
~.,_:,(] .~i·Je it to the vvorlci in stron,__, rescmc.nt, rJ:Tytbmic;sl 
E.n~li21--1, Yvil1 be Cll'l8 o~) tl1c-:- :~:~ltell~~~tLJ~l les.·J~_,r··3 of I-tis 
~er1erju tion. 9 
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,Jesuits T'};inkol•c• ol: t"h.e 
In this way be ~as ~akinz a~ 
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''J:::.:i.tP, t.h·:::t sort of loose unity 
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The thesis, "Modal Entities in Suarez", 
written by Thomas M. Downing. S.J., has been 
accepted by the Graduate School with reference 
to form, and by those readers whose names appear 
below. with reference to content. It is, there-
fore. accepted in partial fulfillment of the re-
quirements for the degree of Master of Arts. 
Father Kennedy 
Father Dollard. 
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